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I.

1.

ISSUES PRESENTED

This Court has recognized a narrow exception to the

requirement that a non-party to litigation receive notice and an opportunity
to be heard before an order is entered that may be applied to that non-party,
limiting that exception to cases where the non-party is acting in concert
with a party, or the party can only act through others (such as a union that
can only act through its members).
Can that narrow exception be extended to a non-party without any
factual findings to support that extension, thus allowing courts to deprive
online publishers of notice and the right to be heard before infringing their
First Amendment rights by ordering them to remove online content?
2.

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l) and (e)(3) prohibit courts from treating

any "provider ... of an interactive computer service ... as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another content provider," and,
separately, from permitting a "cause of action [to] be brought" or "liability
[toJ be imposed" if it is "inconsistent with this section."
Despite Section 230's statutory immunity, may a court enjoin a
website publisher and require it to remove third-party created content from
its website-and impose contempt citations and related liabilities that might
flow from a failure to abide by such an injunction-merely because the
plaintiff chose not to name the website publisher as a party in the litigation?

II.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Yelp Inc. 1 learned for the first time that a prior restraint had been
entered against it when a copy was delivered to its registered agent for
service of process. A00537-547. The default Judgment that included that
prior restraint required Yelp-a non-party to the underlying lawsuit-to
remove reviews critical of Plaintiffs from its website and to not publish

future postings from two Yelp accounts. A00213. Although Yelp had been
given no advance notice that Plaintiffs were seeking a prior restraint against
it, the trial court denied Yelp's motion to vacate the Judgment. A00808810.
The court of appeal affirmed, invoking a nan-ow exception to basic
due process rights that was created to prevent parties from evading an
injunction through gamesmanship. Op. 18- I 9. On review, the appellate
court did not find, or even consider whether, Yelp had engaged in such
misconduct, and did not analyze Yelp's connections with the actual
defendant. The appellate Opinion contemplates contempt and sanctions
1

Along with Yelp's related websites and mobile applications, NonParty Appellant Yelp Inc. is referred to simply as "Yelp" in this Brief.
Plaintiffs Dawn L. Hassell and the Hassell Law Group are referred
to collectively as "Hassell" or "Plaintiffs."
Citations to the three-volume Appendix filed in the court of appeal
are denominated "AOOXXX."
Citations to the appellate court's Memorandum Opinion are to "Op."
Citations to the concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice are to
the "RJN."
2

proceedings against Yelp if it refuses to comply, although Yelp has no
more connection with the enjoined party than it has with the tens of
millions of other third-patty authors whose reviews it hosts on Yelp, and
engaged in no wrongful conduct.
The court of appeal's due process analysis was flawed at virtually
every step. Initially, the court misread U.S. Supreme Court authority that
unequivocally requires notice and an opportunity to be heard in connection
with orders restraining the distribution of speech. The appellate court held
that no prior hearing was required. Op. 23. And while it may be true that
in a narrow category of cases, courts may enjoin speech without a prior
hearing, the law also is clear that a prompt hearing is constitutionally
required to give the enjoined party an opportunity to oppose entry of an
'//h'/1'1'.'/""

injunction against it. That did not happen here. Section jiV.A~, infra.
/;'//////,".'/.

To support its decision, the appellate court grossly expanded a
narrow exception to due process, which gives courts leeway to apply
injunctions to non-patties who-after the injunction is entered-are proven
to have acted in collusion with the enjoined party, such as agents and
abettors of that party. Without analyzing whether these cases should be
extended to this very different factual scenario involving Internet speech,
the court turned this exception into a general rule, which now allows courts
to expressly name non-parties in injunctions without any factual findings of

3

misconduct. In doing so, the court rendered meaningless the careful
guidelines California courts have adopted to limit the scope of this narrow
exception, giving defamation litigants worldwide an incentive to forum
shop in California and a roadmap to circumvent due process rights here.
Section IV .B, infra.
The court reached its conclusion only by pretending that Yelp is
nothing more than the "administrator" of its website, ignoring Yelp's role
as a publisher of third-party authored speech and its First Amendment right
to control its own website. It also invoked this Court's decision in Balboa
Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal. 4th 1141 ("Balboa Island')
to support the prior restraint it entered against Yelp, while ignoring the fact
that in Balboa Island this Court narrowly approved an injunction entered
against a party following a contested trial, and nowhere suggested that
comis may permit injunctions against non-parties following default
proceedings. None of the cases cited by the court of appeal support its
rejection of Yelp's First Amendment rights here. Section IV.C, infi·a.
The court of appeal combined its unwarranted rejection of Yelp's
due process and First Amendment rights, with an unprecedented narrowing
of the previously robust protection provided by the Communications
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 ("Section 230"), to deny Yelp the federal
immunity it would have received if Hassell had sued it. The court exalted
the form of the action-namely, the fact that Yelp was tactically not named
4

as a party-over the plain language of Section 230 and Congress' clear
intent in enacting it to protect websites from actions that treat them as
publishers or distributors of third-party content.
Section 230 immunity plays a vital role in the legal landscape that
has allowed the Internet to flourish. As this Court noted a decade ago in its
sole decision evaluating Section 230, "[t]he provisions of section 230(c)(l),
conferring broad immunity on Internet intermediaries, are [] a strong
demonstration of legislative commitment to the value of maintaining a free
market for online expression." Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Ca1.4th 33,
56 ("Barrett"). In Barrett, this Court made clear that Section 230
immunizes website operators from actions by disgruntled businesses hoping
to punish them for allowing third-party content-even defamatory
content-to remain on their websites. !d. at 39-40. Section V.A, infi·a.
The court of appeal followed Barrett in name alone. Op. 27. Yelp
established its right to Section 230 immunity by demonstrating that
(!)Yelp is a "provider or user of an interactive computer service";
(2) Hassell seeks to treat Yelp as a "publisher or speaker" of the content at
issue; and (3) the action is based on "information provided by another
information content provider." 47 U.S. C.§ 230(c)(l). Courts across the
country consistently have held that Section 230 protection precludes
injunctive relief. E.g., Kathleen R. v. City ofLivermore (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 684, 697-98 ("Kathleen R. "). The broad protection the United
5

States Congress intended when it enacted Section 230 protects Yelp here.
Section V.B, irrfra.
The appellate court rejected Yelp's Section 230 defense only by
treating Yelp "as the publisher or speaker" ofthe information provided by
Bird, contrary to the plain language of Section 230(c)(I). Specifically, the
court affirmed an injunction imposed on Yelp by stretching due process law
to conclude that Yelp was acting "with or for" Bird (Op. 30-31)-treating
Yelp as standing in Bird's shoes solely based on Yelp's role as an online
publisher of her alleged content. The court's misinterpretation of Section
230 is utterly inconsistent with its due process holding-a contradiction
that injects confusion into each of these legal principles. Its decision was
flawed at every step, and must be reversed. Section V.C, inji·a.
Viewed only through the prism of review websites such as Yelp,
Section 230's broad protection ofwebsites that publish third-party content
plainly serves the public interest. E.g., Edwards v. District of Columbia
(D.C. Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 996, 1006 ("[f]urther incentivizing a quality
consumer experience are the numerous consumer review websites, like
Yelp ... , which provide consumers a forum to rate the quality of their
experiences"). If Yelp and entities like it are denied their right to exercise
editorial control in publishing consumer reviews, this will provide
businesses an effective tool to remove critical commentary and consumers
will suffer.
6

But the appellate decision reaches far beyond this single area, vast
though it may be. Internet publishers routinely display third-party content,
including political organizations, media entities, and repositories of creative
content such as YouTube, to name only a few. Some of this content
entertains or educates, while some simultaneously offends, and much of it
walks a line between protected and unprotected speech. The value of such
content lies in the diversity and disparate views and opinions offered
online.
This does not leave plaintiffs like Hassell without a remedyalthough if it did it would not matter because Congress' intent controls. For
twenty years, Congress has insisted that plaintiffs look to the content
creator alone for a remedy, through tools such as judgment liens and
contempt proceedings-post-judgment options that Hassell never pursued
here. During those twenty years, no court has approved Hassell's stratagem
of denying a website publisher its due process rights in order to tactically
avoid the immunity Congress established through Section 230. The
appellate court's blessing of the injunction entered against Yelp, following
an uncontested hearing to prove up the default judgment against Bird alone
(A00213), is a new loophole that this Court should close, lest future
plaintiffs exploit it to escape Section 230's broad immunity.
Ifthis Court were to affirm the appellate court's opinion, Yelp and
other websites would suffer and the public that relies on the wealth of
7

online third-party commentary-to aid decision-making on myriad issues
like consumer purchases, politics, and employment- would be harmed as
subjects of criticism follow Hassell's example: intentionally sue the
commenter alone, perhaps in a manner that maximizes the chance that he or
she will be unable or unwilling to defend the lawsuit regardless of its
underlying merit, and then after a default judgment present the injunction to
the website publisher as an unassailable fait accompli. As the Amicus
letters supporting review explained, people across the world are invoking
the appellate decision to demand that website publishers remove content
they do not like, or reconfigure their websites to hide that content. E.g.,
Amicus Letter of Google, Inc., dated August 10, 2016, at 3; Amicus Letter

ofGlassdoor, Inc., dated August 15,2016, at 2. This case is only one of
many different attempts to misuse the court system in the hope of stifling
speech on the Internet. E.g., RJN Exs. A-C. The court of appeal's decision
threatens to undermine the validity and efficacy of the information
available to consumers, and online speech generally. Yelp respectfully
requests that this Court reverse that decision.
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Yelp Publishes Tens of Millions of Third-Party Authored
Reviews.

Yelp allows any member of the public to read and write online
reviews about local businesses, government services, and other entities.

8

A00240. Yelp is available to the public at no charge and without any
registration requirement. Id. Those who register by creating an account
may write reviews about businesses and service providers, and thus
contribute to a growing body oftens of millions of publicly-available
consumer reviews. Id. Tens of millions of other users read the reviews on
Yelp when making a wide range of consumer and other decisions. Id. The
businesses listed on Yelp also can create free accounts, which allow them
to publicly respond to any review, with such a response appearing next to
the original review. I d. Individuals posting reviews on Yelp can remove
them at any time. A00841. As Yelp's website explains, it applies
automated software to all reviews posted in an attempt to provide the most
helpful reviews to consumers. A00519.
B.

Hassell Obtains An Injunction Against Yelp Without
Giving It Any Notice.

1.

Third-Party Users Write Critical Reviews About
Hassell Law Group On Yelp.

Hassell, a San Francisco attorney, owns The Hassell Law Group,
P.C. A00006. According to Hassell's Complaint, Bird suffered a personal
injury on June 16, 2012, and retained The Hassell Law Group. A00002-3.
After a few months, Hassell ended the attorney-client relationship. I d. On
January 28, 2013 a user with the screen name "Birdzeye B." posted a onestar review ofThe Hassell Law Group on Yelp, complaining that "dawn
hassell made a bad situation much worse for me" and accusing Hassell of
9

failing to communicate with her and abandoning her as a client, among
other things. A00018. Believing that "Birdzeye B." was Bird, Hassell sent
Bird an email that day, requesting she remove the "factual inaccuracies and
defamatory remarks" from Yelp. A00005. Bird replied the next day,
complaining about Hassell's representation. A00348.
2.

Hassell Sues Bird And Obtains A Default
Judgment, Which Includes An Injunction Against
Yelp.

On April 10,2013, Dawn Hassell individually, and the Hassell Law
Group P.C., filed a complaint against Bird, but not Yelp, in San Francisco
Superior Court. A00002. The suit asserted claims based on two allegedly
defamatory reviews-one by Birdzeye B. and another by a reviewer
identified as J.D. (A00004-5i-and sought compensatory and punitive
damages. It also sought injunctive relief against Bird only. A00013.
Although the Birdzeye B. public account profile stated that its creator lived
in Los Angeles (A00091), Bird was served through substitute service on the
owner of the Oakland home in which Bird was injured, who told the
process server that he had not seen Bird in months. A00026. On July 11,
2013, the court entered a default against Bird. A00023.

2

The "J.D." review accused Hassell of improperly deducting costs
from a settlement. A00020. Hassell claimed that "J.D." was Bird based on
the review's use of capitalization, despite the content being at odds with the
original challenged statement. A00034, A00099.
10

On November 1, 2013, Hassell filed a Summary of the Case in
Support of Default Judgment and Request for Injunctive Relief. A0003336. Hassell significantly expanded the relief being sought as described in
the Complaint, adding another allegedly defamatory statement to her claim
(A00036, AOO 102i and demanding for the first time that the court "make
an order compelling Defendant and Yelp to remove the defamatory
statements, including all entire posts, immediately. If for any reason
Defendant does not remove them all by the Court-ordered deadline (which
is likely given Defendant's refusal to answer the complaint), the Court

should order Yelp.com to remove al/3 ofthem." A00051 (emphasis in
original).
Plaintiffs' Request for Judgment went further, seeking "an Order
ordering Yelp.com to remove the reviews and subsequent comments of the

reviewer within 7 business days of the date of the court's Order." AOOOSl
(emphasis added). Hassell intentionally did not serve her application for
default judgment on Yelp or otherwise notify Yelp about it. A00243; see

also A00837. The court granted the requested injunction, including the part
ordering non-party Yelp to remove the existing comments and any

"subsequent" comments posted by "Birdzeye B." or "J.D." A00213. The
court made no factual findings as to Yelp. I d.
3

She added another post from Birdzeye B. that accused Hassell of
trying to "threaten, bully, intimidate, harrass [sic]" her into removing the
reviews. A00036, A00102.
11

C.

The Trial Court Denies Yelp's Motion To Vacate The
Injunction.

On January 28,2014, Yelp's registered agent for service of process
received a letter enclosing a Notice of Entry of Judgment and threatening
Yelp with contempt proceedings if it did not comply with the Judgment.
A00537-547. On February 3, 2014, Yelp responded to Hassell by letter
stating that as a non-party that did not receive notice or an opportunity to be
heard, Yelp was not bound by the terms of the Judgment. A00548-550.
Yelp further explained that Section 230 precludes enforcement of the prior
restraint, or liability as to Yelp. A00549. Hassell did not respond until
April30, 2014. She claimed that her office was "currently setting a motion
to enforce the court's order against Yelp," but did not respond substantively
to Yelp's position. A00551.
On May 23, 2014, Yelp moved to vacate the Judgment. A00225470. Hassell opposed Yelp's Motion to Vacate. A00471-572. On
September 29, 2014, the trial court denied Yelp's Motion. A00808. It
quoted from Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 906 ("Ross"),
and Berger v. Superior Court (1917) 175 Cal. 719, 721 ("Berger"), to hold
that injunctions may run to non-parties who are aiding and abetting an
enjoined person to violate an injunction, and concluded that Yelp fit within
this exception to general due process requirements. A00808-809. It
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implicitly rejected Yelp's claim to immunity under Section 230, not even
referencing it in its order. Jd. 4
D.

The Court Of Appeal Affirms The Trial Court's Decision.

In a published decision, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's
conclusion that Yelp was bound by the prior restraint. Op. 1-2. As relevant
here, the court characterized the portion of the Judgment requiring Yelp to
remove content from its website as a "removal order" (A00212-213)-not
an injunction (Op. !)-and without any explanation, treated the "removal
order" as if it were separate from the Judgment. E.g., Op. 10-11
(concluding that Yelp was not aggrieved by the default judgment, but was
aggrieved by the removal order). 5

4

During oral argument on Yelp's motion, the trial court expressed
disbelief that the statute could mean what this Court, and uniform federal
courts nationwide, have said it means. The trial court complained to Yelp's
counsel that "(w]hat you're saying is you can post any kind of defamatory
information for the world to see, and you can say, we don't have anything
to do with it. We don't care if they say Ms. Hassell shot her mother, or
something like that. It doesn't make any difference. I think your position
is a very hard one to swallow." A00834:6-ll. While this Court expressed
similar reservations about the statute, it followed Congress' directive and
held that as a matter oflaw, websites like Yelp cannot be held liable for
content posted by third parties, even if the content is defamatory. Barrett,
40 Cal.4th at 62-63.
5

Some of the court's holdings grew out of this novel
characterization of the injunction against Yelp, and its Opinion ultimately
turned on its conclusion that Yelp was not subject to an injunction at all.
E.g., Op. 29 ("(a]gain though, the party that was enjoined from publishing
content in this case was Bird, .... "). Title aside, the "removal order" is a
classic injunction and the court of appeal plainly erred by treating it as
anything else. See, e.g., PV Little Italy, LLC v. Metro Work Condominium
Ass'n (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 132, 143 n.S (order returning control of
13

After evaluating Yelp's standing to appeal (issues not raised here),
the appellate court rejected Yelp's argument that due process batTed
enforcement of the injunction against it. Op. 18-23. The court noted, first,
that "An Injunction Can Run Against a Nonparty." Op. 18. Citing a
handful of cases, the court concluded that "settled principles undermine
Yelp's theory that the trial court was without any authority to include a
provision in the Bird judgment which ordered Yelp to effectuate the
injunction against Bird by deleting her defamatory reviews." Op. 19.
The appellate court did not discuss or apply any of the requirements
that California courts have enunciated to justifY extending an injunction to
a non-party. Op. I 9-21. Instead, it simply distinguished the cases Yelp
cited, concluding that none presented facts similar to those presented here.

!d. The court made clear that its decision did not turn on the facts of the
case, and that the question of whether Yelp was "aiding and abetting"
Bird's violation of the injunction "has no bearing on the question whether
the trial court was without power to issue the removal order in the first
instance." Op. 21.
The court next rejected Yelp's argument that the First Amendment
protects its right to distribute Bird's speech. Op. 21-23. The court

association to non-parties was properly characterized as injunction); People
v. Brewer (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 122, 135 (defining injunction "as a writ
or order commanding a person either to perform or to refrain from
performing a particular act" (citation omitted)).
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distinguished a U.S. Supreme Court case holding that book and magazine
distributors are entitled to due process in connection with a seizure order.
Op. 21-22 (citing Marcus v. Search Warrants (1961) 367 U.S. 717
("Marcus")). The court explained that "in this context, it appears to us that

the removal order does not treat Yelp as a publisher ofBird's speech, but
rather as the administrator of the forum that Bird utilized to publish her
defamatory reviews." !d. The court provided no definition of its newly
fashioned term "administrator of the forum." The court believed that the
issue was whether a prior hearing was required, and that this case differs
from Marcus because here "specific speech has already been found to be
defamatory in a judicial proceeding." Op. 23.
The court also rejected Yelp's argument that the injunction is an
unconstitutional prior restraint. Op. 23-26. Expanding this Court's
decision in Balboa Island to apply to non-party Yelp, the court held that
"the trial court had the power to make the part of this order requiring Yelp
to remove the [statements at issue] because the injunction prohibiting Bird
from repeating those statements was issued following a determination at
trial that those statements are defamatory." Op. 25. It narrowly reversed
only that part of the trial court's order that barred publication of any
comments by "Birdzeye B." or "J.D." that might be posted in the future.

!d.
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Finally, the court held that Section 230 did not protect Yelp from
Hassell's injunction. Op. 26-31. Its decision turned largely on the fact that
Hassell tactically chose not to sue Yelp, or even give it advance notice of
her claims, which the court found "distinguish[ed] the present case from
Yelp's authority, all cases in which causes of action or lawsuits against
internet service providers were dismissed pursuant to section 230." Op. 28
(citations omitted); see also id. 29-30. The court reasoned that "[i]fan
injunction is itself a form of liability, that liability was imposed on Bird, not
Yelp." !d. 30-31. The court rejected each ofYelp's arguments. Op. 29-31.

IV.
INTERNET PUBLISHERS LIKE YELP ARE ENTITLED TO
NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD BEFORE THEY
ARE ORDERED TO REMOVE CONTENT
The injunction here names Yelp-although it is not a party to this
action-and specifically orders Yelp to remove third-party authored content
from its website. Invoking what it described as "settled principles" to reject
Yelp's due process arguments, the court of appeal insisted that a non-party
may be subject to an injunction if it might, at some point in the future, be
held to have "act[ed) in concert with the enjoined party and in support of its
claims." Op. 19 (citations omitted).
But none of the cases the court cited touches on the issue presented
here: whether a non-party to litigation has a right to challenge an order that

expressly names it and affects its own rights-here, Yelp's right to maintain
third-party authored reviews that are critical of others on its website,
16

sometimes in conflict with the desires of businesses that reject criticism and
aim to remove such commentary from public view. 6 And none allowed an
injunction where the non-party has such a remote connection to the party
enjoined. The only connection between Yelp and Bird is that Bird, like
tens of millions of people, posts reviews on Yelp. The court's application
of an exceedingly narrow exception to fundamental due process
requirements grossly expands that exception beyond its intent and purpose
and endangers protections for free speech online.
A.

Due Process Requires Notice And An Opportunity To Be
Heard Before Being Subject To An Order Affecting
Rights.

The requirements of notice and hearing are firmly rooted in the
United States and California Constitutions. As the court made clear in
Estate ofBuchman (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 546, 559, "[t]he fundamental

conception of a court of justice is condemnation only after notice and
hearing." Thus, "[t]he power vested in a judge is to hear and determine, not
to determine without hearing," and the Constitution requires a fair hearing.

ld. at 560; see also People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Ca1.3d 260,263-64.
This Court long ago reaffirmed as a "seemingly self-evident
proposition that a judgment in personam may not be entered against one not

6

If Yelp removed every review a business owner argued was false
or even defamatory, it would have few critical reviews on its website. Yelp
resisted Plaintiffs' claims here to maintain the integrity of its website, for
the benefit of its users.
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a party to the action." Fazziv. Peters (1968) 68 Cal.2d 590, 591 ("Fazzi").
As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, courts "may not grant an enforcement
order or injunction so broad as to make punishable the conduct of persons
who act independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according
to law." Regal Knitwear Co. v. NL.R.B. (1945) 324 U.S. 9, 13 ("Regal

Knitwear"). That Court elsewhere explained that "it would violate the Due
Process Clause ... to bind litigants to a judgment rendered in an earlier
litigation to which they were not parties and in which they were not
adequately represented." Richards v. Jefferson County (1996) 517 U.S.
793, 794 (prior adjudication in tax case did not apply to petitioners because
they were neither parties nor adequately represented in that case); see also

Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. ofIll. Found. (1971) 402 U.S. 313, 329
("Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may not be
collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a
chance to present their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process
prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing adjudications of the
identical issue which stand squarely against their position."); Chase

National Bankv. City ofNorwalk, Ohio (1934) 291 U.S. 431, 440-441
(reversing injunction entered against non-party; "[u]nless duly summoned
to appear in a legal proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a
judgment recovered therein will not affect his legal rights").
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Despite these settled constitutional principles, Hassell intentionally
sought to abrogate Yelp's due process rights when she moved for a default
judgment; as she put it she "anticipated that Defendant Bird would refuse to
remove the Yelp review." A00482. 7 The trial court agreed, enjoining
speech that Yelp displays and-through automated software applying
criteria developed for the benefit of consumers-may, in its discretion, use
to provide an aggregate rating of the Hassell Law Group to consumers
looking to hire lawyers. A00212-213, A00519. The appellate court
approved this gambit, holding that Yelp was not entitled to notice. Op. 2,
23. But because Yelp has a separate First Amendment right to distribute
/.'""·/

the speech of others (Section lc;,
infra), it was entitled to a hearing to
o;,,......~
oppose entry of the overbroad injunction that restrained speech on its
website. See Heller v. New York (1973) 413 U.S. 483, 489 ("Heller")
("because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures
the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure
requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint"
(citations, internal quotes omitted; emphasis in original)). 8

7

Indeed, at the hearing on the motion to vacate, Hassell admitted
that she did not name Yelp in her Complaint because Yelp is immune from
suit under Section 230, although she also made a half-hearted (and
incorrect) argument below that Yelp did not qualifY for Section 230
immunity. A00837; compare footnote 19, infra.
8

See also Carroll v. President & Commissioners ofPrincess Anne
(1968) 393 U.S. 175, 180 ("there is no place within the area of basic
19

The court of appeal's invocation of Heller-which decided whether
a party is entitled to an adversarial hearing before speech is seized-missed
the point. Op. 23. Yelp did not receive any hearing; it had no opportunity
to challenge the trial court's conclusion-reached in an uncontested
hearing following a default judgment-that the speech at issue was

defamatory and must be removed, and that Yelp must not allow future
speech to be posted by Bird. The appellate court plainly erred in failing to
recognize the "seemingly self-evident proposition" (Fazzi, 68 Cal.2d at
591) that Yelp was denied its due process right to notice and a hearing
before the injunction was entered against it, and in narrowly reversing only
the part of the injunction that barred future speech. Op. 25. As shown
below, the line of cases it invoked does not support the broad abandonment
of due process that occurred here. Section B, infra.

freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment" for ex parte orders "where
no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing
parties and to give them an opportunity to participate"); Lee Art Theatre,
Inc. v. Virginia (1968) 392 U.S. 636, 637 (reversing conviction based on
public display of movie alleged to be obscene; seizure warrant "fell short of
constitutional requirements demanding necessary sensitivity to freedom of
expression" (citations omitted)); A Quantity of Copies ofBooks v. Kansas
(1964) 378 U.S. 205,212-213 ("if seizure ofbooks precedes an adversary
determination of their obscenity, there is danger of abridgment of the right
of the public in a free society to unobstructed circulation ofnonobscene
books" (citations omitted)); Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 294,309 (ordinance allowing seizure of news racks
without prior notice violated the First Amendment; "the Constitution does
require that any such summary seizure procedure be narrowly drafted so as
to minimize interference with First Amendment rights").
20

B.

The Court Of Appeal Diminished Fundamental Due
Process Protections By Expanding A Narrow Rule
Allowing Courts To Enjoin Aiders, Abettors, And Agents
Of Parties.

In rejecting Yelp's due process arguments, the court of appeal
invoked what it characterized as "settled principles" of law that in limited
circumstances allow an injunction to "run to classes of persons with or
through whom the enjoined party may act." Op. 19. This narrow exception
to the general due process requirement of notice and an opportunity to be
heard allows an injunction to be enforced against a non-party who is not

named in the injunction based on evidence establishing that the enjoined
party and the non-party acted together to evade the injunction, or the
enjoined party and non-party have a close relationship such as union and
member. Op. 19-21. The appellate court held that these cases authorized
an injunction that expressly applies to Yelp, without any factual findings or
evidence that Yelp engaged in the type of conduct, or had the type of
relationship with the enjoined party, that California courts consistently have
required. ld.
In Regal Knitwear, 324 U.S. at 14, the U.S. Supreme Court
explained the very narrow purpose of this exception-that successors and
assigns may be bound by an injunction if they are "instrumentalities
through which defendant seeks to evade an order or [) come within the
description of persons in active concert or participation with them in the
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violation of an injunction." The Supreme Court did not decide if the nonparties there could be held liable for violating the injunction, although it
cautioned that it "depends on an appraisal of his relations and behavior and
not upon mere construction of terms of the order." !d. at 15; see also In re
Lennon (1897) 166 U.S. 548, 554-555 (injunction against railroad company
could be enforced against one of its employees). As Judge Learned Hand
explained nearly a century ago, a court is "is not vested with sovereign
powers to declare conduct unlawful; its jurisdiction is limited to those over
whom it gets personal service, and who therefore can have their day in
court." A/emile Mfg. Corp. v. Staff(2d Cir. 1930) 42 F.2d 832, 832-833.
The court emphasized that "[t]his means that the respondent must either
abet the defendant, or must be legally identified with him." Id. (emphasis
added).
One California court has explained that this "common practice" of
"mak[ing] the injunction run also to classes of persons through whom the
enjoined party may act" means that "enjoined parties may not play
jurisdictional shell games; they may not nullifY an injunctive decree by
carrying out prohibited acts with or through nonparties to the original
proceeding." People v. Kothari (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 759,766-767
(reversing injunction against property owners that also would bind all
future owners of the property) (citations omitted; emphasis added). The
court elaborated that courts may extend injunctions only to
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"'instrumentalities through which [the] defendant seeks to evade an order
or ... persons in active concert or participation with them in the violation of
an injunction."' ld. at 770 (citation omitted; emphasis added). Thus, this
rule allows courts to enjoin third parties who are acting at the behest and for
the benefit of the third party, and not in pursuit of their own rights.
Yelp is aware of only one case presenting similar facts, and that
court rejected the argument Hassell makes here. Blockowicz v. Williams
(N.D. Ill. 2009) 675 F.Supp.2d 912, aff'd (7th Cir. 2010) 630 F.3d 563.
There, the court refused to enforce an injunction as to a non-party website
hosting defamatory content, explaining that the website operator's "only
act, entering into a contract with the defendants, occurred long before the
injunction was issued. Since the injunction was issued, [the website
operator] has simply done nothing, and it has certainly not actively assisted
the defendants in violating the injunction." I d. at 916.
In contrast, none of the cases the court of appeal invoked to support
its holding enforced an injunction against a non-party on facts anything like
those here. Op. 19. In most, the court refused to enforce an injunction
against a non-party, finding that the relationship with the party was not
close enough to justify the attempt, or remanding for further consideration
of the evidence against the non-party. Berger, 175 Cal. at 719-720
(injunction against union and members could not be enforced against nonunion member); Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Garibaldi (2003) 107
23

Cal.App.4th 345, 353 (refusing to enforce injunction against abortion
protestors neither named individually nor as class members); People v.
Conrad (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 896, 903-904 (injunction against anti-

abortion group could not be applied to separate group); In re Berry (1968)
68 Cal.2d 137, 155-156 (reversing injunction related to union activity
because it enjoined persons acting "in concert among themselves").
The court of appeal cited only one decision affirming enforcement of
an injunction against a non-party. Op. 19 (citing Ross, 19 Cal.3 d at 905). 9
In Ross, this Court held that an injunction against a state agency could be
enforced against county agencies that served as agents in administering the
program at issue. But that holding turned on the relationship between the
state and county agencies. ld. at 907-908. The Court explained that
because the state agency "could comply with the provisions of the ... order
... only through the actions of county welfare departments, it is clear that
such counties could not disobey the order with impunity." Jd. at 909. Here,
in contrast, Bird herself could comply with the injunction at any time by
removing the review from Yelp; no cooperation by Yelp is required to
effectuate the injunction against Bird. A00841. And needless to say, Yelp
is not Bird's agent.
9

In addition, the court separately rejected Yelp's reliance on People
ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Ca1.4th 1090, 1125, in which this Court
affirmed a gang injunction against non-parties because "the gang itself,
acting through its membership, (] was responsible for creating and
maintaining the public nuisance" at issue.
24

The couti of appeal's opinion skews this line of cases, drastically
expanding them beyond their original intent, in three fundamental ways.
First, in none of the cases cited-and indeed, no case known to Yelp-did

the court approve an injunction that required a specifically-named nonparty to act, or not act, as ordered. Each evaluated application of an
injunction to a non-party not explicitly named. E.g., In re Berry, 68 Cal.2d
at 155-156 (strikers, who were not members of enjoined union); Planned
Parenthood, 107 Cal.App.4th at 350-351 (abortion protestors). In

explicitly directing the injunction to Yelp, the court treated Yelp as if it had
been a party and present in the case all along with full opportunity to stand
up for its rights as a publisher, ignoring the reality that Hassell intentionally
did not sue Yelp and prevented Yelp from learning about the application for
the injunction in the first place. The appellate court's decision does not
even mention that the court was applying these cases to a completely
different set of facts, or contemplate the implications of its decision to do
so. Its perfunctory analysis led to the wrong result.
Second, the court made clear that it did not base its decision on any

conduct by Yelp, explaining that the question of whether Yelp aided and
abetted Bird's alleged violation of the injunction was "potentially
improper" and "has no bearing on the question whether the trial court was
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without power to issue the [injunction] in the first instance." Op. 21. 10
Thus, the court affirmed the injunction against Yelp without any evidence
that Yelp engaged in the type of conduct that courts-including this
Court-consistently require to justifY applying an injunction to a non-party
allegedly colluding with the enjoined party. Op. 19; e.g., Regal Knitwear,
324 U.S. at 16 (a decision to enjoin a specific party as a successor or assign
would require "a judicial hearing, in which their operation could be
determined on a concrete set of facts"); see also id. at 15 ("whether a
nonparty is bound 'depends on an appraisal of his relations and
behavior"'). 11 Here, there was no appraisal ofYelp's behavior or conduct

10

The appellate court contemplated a second hearing, at which the
trial court would decide whether Yelp should be held in contempt. Op. 18.
But Yelp is faced with an injunction that expressly enjoins it and should not
have to decide between complying with an unconstitutional prior restraint
and risking contempt sanctions. The procedure the court of appeal
endorses-entering an injunction without notice and asking later ifthe
injunction is proper, all while entertaining contempt enforcement-is not
and cannot be the law in California. Cf In re Berry, 68 Cal.2d at 148-149
(person affected by injunction may seek "a judicial declaration as to its
jurisdictional validity" or violate the order and risk contempt sanctions).
Under the court's rationale, no reason exists to give anyone advance notice
that an injunction is being sought against them. Op. 21. The enjoined party
could just argue afterwards-in opposing contempt proceedings-that no
facts support the injunction. But that is not, and should not be, the law in
California.
11

Accord Lake Shore Asset Mgmt. Ltd. v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm 'n (7th Cir. 2007) 511 F.3d 762, 767 (whether injunction can
be applied to non-party "is a decision that may be made only after the
person in question is given notice and an opportunity to be heard''
(emphasis added)).
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before Yelp was explicitly named in the injunction and later threatened
with contempt proceedings. A00211.
No prior case has gone so far. Moreover, the court reached its
decision without any analysis or appreciation of how its unfettered
expansion ofthis formerly narrow exception to due process will affect
websites like Yelp, which publish tens of millions of third-party
submissions, but which have no other relationships with those third
parties-much less connections that justify being treated as their agents. If
this narrow exception can be applied to Yelp-which is connected to Bird
only because she is one of millions of people who post on Yelp-it can be
applied to any third party. The exception will have swallowed the rule. A
newspaper that refuses to remove a published letter to the editor or a quote
fi·om a source in an article, a bookstore that continues to sell a book found
to be misleading, and a library that provides Internet access, all are nonparties "with or through whom [an] enjoined party may act." But none has
the type of close relationship with the enjoined party that courts
consistently have required to hold them bound by an injunction to which
they were not a party.
Tlrird, the court ignored Yelp's interests in its own website-

permitting California courts to view a non-party's conduct solely through
the lens of a plaintiffs unopposed characterizations of the defendant's
alleged conduct, without regard to the separate interests of the non-party
27

(here Yelp, a publisher) in the conduct or speech being enjoined. The court
rejected the cases Yelp cited solely because they involved money
judgments. Op. 20-21 (citing Fazzi, 68 Cal.2d 590; Tokio Marine & Fire

Ins. Corp. v. W. Pac. Roofing Corp. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 110). The
appellate court did not explain why Yelp should receive less protection
against a prior restraint-which this Court has described as "one of the
most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence [which] carr[ies] a
heavy burden against constitutional validity" (People v. Lucas (20 14) 60
Cal.4th 153,261, disapproved on other grounds, People v. Romero (2015)
62 Cal. 4th 1; citation omitted)-than it would against a mere money
judgment. As discussed below, independently, Yelp's First Amendment
right to control the content of its website easily transcends the other
interests that have been held to be worthy of the protections of the Due
Process clause. See Section C, inji·a.
C.

Yelp Has A First Amendment Right To Publish Reviews
On Its Website.

In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeal declared
without analysis or supporting legal authority that the injunction "does not
treat Yelp as a publisher ofBird's speech, but rather as the administrator of
the forum that Bird utilized to publish her defamatory reviews." Op. 22.
The appellate court's faulty reasoning ignores Yelp's important role as an
online publisher and its strong interest in developing and maintaining a
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trusted resource that provides helpfbl consumer reviews to the public,
including critical reviews that dissatisfied clients post.
To support its ovetTeach, the court purported to distinguish Marcus
and Heller, but it overlooked the fundamental point of these and the many
other cases that protect the right to distribute speech. Op. 22-23. The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right to distribute
speech, separate from the right to make the speech in the first instance,
which cannot be infringed without notice and an opportunity to be heard.

See, e.g., Marcus, 367 U.S. at 731-732 (wholesale distributor of books and
magazines had right to prompt hearing in connection with seized materials);

Heller, 413 U.S. at 489-490 (seizure without a prior hearing is permissible
only if adequate procedural safeguards are followed).
Yelp and other online forums like it are not merely the
"administrators" of their websites, whatever the court of appeal meant by
this undefined term. They are publishers and editors whose actions to
disseminate speech are fully protected by the First Amendment and due
process rights. E.g., Bigelow v. Virginia (1975) 421 U.S. 809, 822
(newspaper entitled to protection of First Amendment in publishing birth
control advertisement, in part because of the public interest in the
information at issue); Arkansas Educational Television v. Forbes (1998)
523 U.S. 666, 674 ("[w]hen a public broadcaster exercises editorial
discretion in the selection and presentation of its programming, it engages
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in speech activity ... Although programming decisions often involve the
compilation of the speech of third parties, the decisions nonetheless
constitute communicative acts" (citations omitted)); see also footnote 8,
supra. 12 Yelp, for example, has developed automated software designed to
enhance users' experiences by showcasing more helpful content over
potentially less helpful content (like paid-for reviews). E.g., A00519. And
Yelp maintains terms of service and content guidelines that, when violated,
can lead to the removal of offending content. A0056 I. The third-party
authored reviews that Yelp hosts also serve as the basis for the aggregate
Yelp star rating that each business receives, depending on the criteria
developed by Yelp and applied through its automated software. A00519.
The fiction adopted by the court of appeal-inventing a role it
coined "administrator of the forum," which apparently has none of the
constitutional protections granted to publishers-to brush aside Yelp's clear
interest in the integrity of its website was unprecedented and led to the
wrong result here. The appellate court invoked Balboa Island to support its
decision but this too was an unwarranted expansion of existing law. As the
U.S. Supreme Court explained in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart:

12

Even the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, involved third-party speechthere, an "advertorial" published by the New York Times titled "Heed Their
Rising Voices," soliciting funds to defend the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.
against an Alabama perjury indictment, among other things. !d. at 256-257.
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[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights. A criminal penalty or a judgment in a
defamation case is subject to the whole panoply of protections
afforded by defening the impact of the judgment until all
avenues of appellate review have been exhausted. Only after
judgment has become final, conect or otherwise, does the
law's sanction become fully operative.
A prior restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an
immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a
threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication "chills"
speech, prior restraint "freezes" it at least for the time.
(1976) 427

u.s. 539, 559.

Similarly, in Wilson v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 652, 660,
this Court rejected a prior restraint that prohibited further publication of a
political candidate's newsletter criticizing his opponent. I d. at 662. The
Court explained that "if publication of the Pentagon Papers did not
constitute a sufficiently serious threat to justify creation of an exception to
the established principles [against prior restraints] set forth above, the
circulation of election campaign charges, even if deemed extravagant or
misleading, does not present a danger of sufficient magnitude to warrant a
prior restraint." I d. at 660; see also Hurvitz v. Hoejjlin (2000) 84
Cai.App.4th 1232, 1241 (order baning release of private, embarrassing,
information is prior restraint and presumptively unconstitutional); Evans v.
Evans (2008) 162 Cai.App.4th 1157, 1167 ("[p ]rior restraints are highly

disfavored and presumptively violate the First Amendment" (citation
omitted)); Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Los Angeles
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Times Comm 'n LLC (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 808, 821-824 (affirming order

striking complaint seeking prior restraint).
As this Court intentionally made clear in Balboa Island, because
prior restraints are disfavored, they can be entered, if at all, only following
a process that fully protects the rights of the party sought to be enjoined. 40
Ca1.4th at 1155-1156. "'An order issued in the area of First Amendment
rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pinpointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential
needs of the public order. In this sensitive field, the State may not employ
'means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved.' . . . In other words, the order must be tailored
as precisely as possible to the exact needs ofthe case." Jd. at 1159 (quoting
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. at 183-184). In Balboa Island, the Court approved

an order enjoining the repetition of a statement found to be defamatory at a
contested trial, although it also found part to be invalid because it applied

to the defendant and "all other persons in active concert and participation
with her," but no evidence in the record supported a finding that anyone
else made defamatory statements. I d. at 1158, 1160.
Here, unlike in Balboa Island, the court approved a prior restraint
(i) against a non-party that had no notice or opportunity to oppose the prior
restraint (ii) following a default judgment, not a contested trial, (iii) based
on an Order that did not evaluate any of the individual statements to
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determine if they are false, defamatory, and unprivileged. A00211. Cf
Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 57 ("[ d]efamation law is complex, requiring

consideration of multiple factors"). Balboa Island does not support the
prior restraint entered against Yelp here, nor should it be expanded beyond
its unique application.
Neither this Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed a prior
restraint on speech to stand-even against threats to national securityunless the enjoined party received the full panoply of protections required
by the U.S. and California Constitutions. The appellate court's decision
approving a prior restraint here, based on nothing more than an uncontested
default proceeding following no notice to Yelp and questionable notice to
defendant (A00026) flies in the face of the federal and state decisions that
have uniformly concluded that prior restraints on speech are among the
most egregious and least defensible orders that can be entered by a court.
None of the appellate court's reasons for affirming the prior restraint
entered against Yelp withstand scrutiny. Its Opinion should be reversed
and the trial court should be directed to enter an order granting Yelp the
relief it sought-vacating the Judgment to the extent that it ordered Yelp to
take any action on the content it publishes on its website. A00237-238.
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V.
SECTION 230 BARS THE INJUNCTION AGAINST YELP
BASED ON COMMENTS POSTED BY "BIRDZEYE B." AND "J.D."
The Internet has effected one of the greatest expansions of free
speech and communications in history. It is "a tool for bringing together
the small contributions of millions of people and making them matter." 13
Today, nearly 3.5 billion people use the Internet, submitting and viewing
hundreds of millions of posts, comments, photos, videos and other content
every day. 14 As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "the content on the Internet
is as diverse as human thought." Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union
(1997) 521 U.S. 844,852 (citation omitted).
This is no accident. In 1996, to promote the free flow of infonnation
on the Internet, Congress resolved to protect websites and other online
providers from liability for their users' content. Section 230 embodies that
command, prohibiting courts from treating such a provider as the
"publisher or speaker" of third-party content. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).

13

Lev Grossman, You-Yes, You-Are TIME's Person of the Year,
TIME MAGAZINE (Dec. 25, 2006).
14

"Internet Users," Internet Live Stats, available at
http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ (visited October 31, 2016);
see also Mary Madden and Kathryn Zickuhr, 65% of online adults use
social networking sites (Aug. 26, 2011), available at
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Social-Networking-Sites.aspx (as of
2011, 65% of online adults used social networking sites); Josh James, How
Much Data Is Created Eve1y Minute? (June 8, 2012), available at
http://www. domo. com/b I og/20 12/06/how-much-data-is-created -everyminute/?dkw=socf3.
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Grounded in core First Amendment principles, Section 230 offers strong
protection for innovation and expansion of free speech on the Internet.
A.

Section 230 Protects Online Publishers From All Legal
Actions Based On Third-Party Content.

Section 230 was adopted to "preserve the vibrant and competitive
free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation," and to
"encourage the development ofteclmologies which maximize user control
over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who
use the Internet." 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(2), (3). To achieve these and other
goals, Congress barred any claims against website publishers based on the
publication ofthird-prirty content-i.e., content not created by the website
operator itself, but contributed by an array of authors, photographers, and
others that provide a diversity of expression that extends far beyond the
resources of any one single online publisher. Section 230 sets forth a
straightforward principle: If someone authors injurious content, a plaintiff
can pursue the author of that content, but not the entity that" displays it on
the Internet. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see generally Carafano v.

Metrosplash.com Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 FJd 1119, 1124 ("Carafano")
(protecting website where "the selection of the content was left exclusively
to the user").
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This Court recognized that purpose in its only decision interpreting
Section 230, Barrett v. Rosenthal, holding that Section 230 "precludes
courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service
provider in a publisher's role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial
functions-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or
alter content-are barred." 40 Cal.4th at 43-44 (citing Zeran v. America
Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327, 330 ("Zeran")). The Court
invoked "the congressional finding that the Internet has flourished 'with a
minimum ofgovernment regulation'(§ 230(a)(4)), and the policy statement
favoring a free market for interactive computer services 'urifettered by
Federal or State regulation'(§ 230(b)(2))" to support its decision rejecting
liability there. Id. at 44 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-331; emphasis
added). The Court reiterated that "Congress 'made a policy choice ... not to
deter harmful online speech [by] imposing tort liability on companies that
serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages."'

Id.
As this Court discussed in Barrett, Section 230 grew out of cases
early in the life of the Internet that attempted to adapt common law tort
liability principles to Internet publishers. 40 Cal.4th at 44. In 1995, "a
service provider was held liable for defamat01y comments posted on one of
its bulletin boards, based on a finding that the provider had adopted the role
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of 'publisher' by actively screening and editing postings." !d. (citing

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co. (N.Y. Sup. 1995) 1995 WL
323710, at *4). The Court explained that, "' [f]earing that the specter of
liability would ... deter service providers from blocking and screening
offensive material, Congress enacted § 230's broad immunity,' which
'forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the
exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions."' !d. (citing Zeran,
129 F.3d at 331).
Indeed, Congress left few doubts about its intentions. The
legislative history expressly stated that Congress intended to overrule

Stratton Oakmont "and any other similar decisions which have treated such
providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their
own because they have restricted access to objectionable material." See
S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230 (1996) (emphasis added).
To accomplish its broad goals, Section 230 provides that "[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider," and it separately preempts any state law, including
imposition of tort liability that is inconsistent with its protections. 47
U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1) & (e)(3). Courts reviewing Section 230's legislative
history have found that it has two primary goals.
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First, "Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust
nature oflnternet communication and, accordingly, to keep government
interference in the medium to a minimum." Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
Second, Congress designed Section 230 to "encourage service
providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their
services .... In line with this purpose,§ 230 forbids the imposition of
publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and
self-regulatory functions." !d. (emphasis added); accord Carafano, 339
F.3d at 1122-23; Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 1018, 1027-28
('Batzel").
To further these two complimentary policy goals, "courts have
treated§ 230(c) immunity as quite robust," Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123,
and federal courts consistently have rejected attempts to hold defendants
responsible for third-party content posted on their websites. 15 As the Ninth
Circuit explained, "close cases ... must be resolved in favor of immunity,
15

See, e.g., Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC (1st Cir. 2016) 817 F.3d 12,
22; Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc. (1st Cir. 2007) 478 FJd
413,.419; Ricci v. Teamsters UnionLocal456 (2d Cir. 2015) 781 F.3d 25,
28; Green v. America Online, Inc. (3d Cir. 2003) 318 F.3d 465, 470-72;
Zeran, !29 F .3d at 330-32; Doe v. MySpace, Inc. (5th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d
413, 418; Jones v. Dirty World Entm 'I Recordings LLC (6th Cir. 2014) 755
F.3d 398, 408; Chicago Lawyers' Comm.for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc.
v. Craigslisl, Inc. (7th Cir. 2008) 519 F.3d 666, 671 ("Chicago Lawyers");
Johnson v. Arden (8th Cir. 2010) 614 F.3d 785, 792; Carafano, 339 F.3d at
1125; Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031-32; Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America
Online Inc. (lOth Cir. 2000) 206 F.3d 980, 984-86 ("Ben Ezra"); Almeida v.
Amazon. com, Inc. (11th Cir. 2006) 456 F.3d 1316, 1321; Klayman v.
Zuckerberg (D.C. Cir. 2014) 753 F.3d 1354, 1358.
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lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face death by
ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or
encouraged-or at least tacitly assented to-the illegality of third parties."
Fair Hous. Council ofSan Fernando Valley v. Roommates. Com, LLC (9th

Cir. 2008) 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (en bane).
In each of these decisions, the appellate court properly focused on
the author of the content-rather than the distributor-no matter how
offensive or objectionable the content might be. This is because "Congress
made a policy choice ... not to deter harmful online speech through the
separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as
intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages." Zeran,
129 F .3d at 330; see also Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs. Com,
Inc. (4th Cir. 2009) 591 F.3d 250, 254-255 (Section 230 "immunity

protects websites not only from ultimate liability, but also from having to
fight costly and protracted legal battles" (citations, internal quotes
omitted)); accord Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.
In Barrett, relying heavily on federal decisions such as Zeran, this
Court broadly construed the federal statute to reject both the appellate
court's distinction between publishers and distributors for purposes of
Section 230 immunity, and the notice-based liability urged by the plaintiff
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there. 16 The Court explained that "(b]ecause the probable effects of
distributor liability on the vigor ofinternet speech and on service provider
self-regulation are directly contrary to § 230's statutory purposes, we will
not assume that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact." Id.
at 46 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333). The Court agreed with cases that
followed Zeran, explaining that "Congress contemplated self-regulation,
rather than regulation compelled at the sword point of tort liability." Jd. at
46-47, 53. 17 The Court agreed with the concern noted in Zeran that
"[n]otice-based liability for service providers would allow complaining
parties to impose substantial burdens on the freedom oflnternet speech by
lodging complaints whenever they were displeased by an online posting,"
explaining that "[t]he volume and range oflnternet communications make
the 'heckler's veto' a real threat under the Court of Appeal's holding." Id.
at 57-58 (citations omitted).
Those same problems would find new life in California if this Court
approved the no-notice injunction that the appellate court allowed here.
16

This Court was reviewing the court of appeal's holding that ISPs
and users "are exposed to liability if they republish a statement with notice
of its defamatory character." 42 Cal. 4th at 39.
17

The Court supported its decision, in part, by the U.S. Congress's
express approval ofthe broad interpretation of Section 230(c) in cases such
as Zeran, Ben Ezra and Doe v. America Online (Fla. 2001) 783 So.2d 1010.
Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 54 & n.l7 (citations omitted). In extending the reach
of Section 230 in 2002, Congress stated that "[t]he Committee intends these
interpretations of section 230(c) to be equally applicable to those entities
covered by" the new law. !d. (citation omitted).
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That is why, in this Court's words, the statute is so broad as to provide
"blanket immunity for those who intentionally redistribute defamatory
statements on the internet." Barrett, 40 Ca1.4th at 62-63. It does so "to
protect online freedom of expression and to encourage self-regulation, as
Congress intended." !d. at 63.
B.

Yelp Established Its Right To Section 230 Immunity.

As discussed above, under Section 230, "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider," and
separately "any state law, including imposition of tort liability, that is
inconsistent with its protections," is preempted. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(l) &
(e)(3) (emphasis added). The statute defines "interactive computer service"
as "any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server," 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), and "Internet content provider" as "any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service." !d. § 230(f)(3). An "access software
provider" is "a provider of ... enabling tools that ... pick, choose, analyze
or digest content; or transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search,
subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content." !d. § 230(f)(4).
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Thus, while a plaintiff may pursue remedies against the creator of
allegedly unlawful online content, that plaintiff may not pursue claims of
any form against website publishers who are (1) a "provider or user of an
interactive computer service"; (2) where plaintiff seeks to treat the website
publisher as a "publisher or speaker"; and (3) the action is based on
"information provided by another information content provider." 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1); see Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 830.
Section 230 bars the injunction against Yelp, as well as any liability
for failing to comply with the injunction. First, Yelp qualifies as a provider
of"an interactive computer service" because it operates a website.
Universal Commc 'n Sys., 478 F.3d at 419 ("web site operators ... are

providers of interactive computer services within the meaning of Section
230"); Batzel, 333 FJd at 1030 n.16.
Second (addressing the third requirement for the statute to apply),

"Birdzeye B." and "J.D."-the users who posted comments on Yelp-are
"information content providers" because they are wholly responsible for the
creation of the content ofthe comments. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3). 18

18

See also, e.g., Doe II v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561,
572-73 (web site, as publisher of third-party content, had immunity, and
decision "to restrict or make available certain material is expressly covered
by section 230"); Hupp v. Freedom Commc'ns, Inc. (2013) 221
Cal.App.4th 398, 400, 405 (Section 230 barred a lawsuit where the plaintiff
alleged a newspaper "breached its user agreement with [plaintiff] by failing
to remove comments made on their website concerning" him where the
comments were written and posted by third parties); Delfino v. Agilent
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Hassell has never alleged, and cannot, that Yelp played any role in the
authorship ofBirdzeye B. or J.D.'s comments. 19

Third-and the key issue before this Court-the injunction against
Yelp treats it as a publisher or speaker. As the Fourth Circuit explained in

Zeran, "[p]ublication does not only describe the choice by an author to
include certain information. In addition, both the negligent communication
of a defamatory statement and the failure to remove such a statement when
first communicated by another party-each alleged by Zeran here under a
negligence label-constitute publication." 129 F.3d at 332 (citations
Techs., Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 807-08 (Section 230 immunity
applied to claims brought by recipients oflnternet threats against the
transmitter of threats and his employer, whose computer system he used);
Shiamili v. Real Estate Group ofNew York, Inc. (N.Y. 2011) 17 N.Y.3d
281, 285, 293 (website that "promoted" a user's allegedly defamatory
comment to a stand-alone post accompanied by an insulting illustration and
some content remained immune from suit under Section 230; the "added
headings and illustration do not materially contribute to the defamatory
nature of the third-party statements").
19

In the briefing below, Hassell conceded that Yelp is a provider of
interactive computer services, and that she is seeking to treat Yelp as the
publisher or speaker of information provided by readers. A00486:27A00488:13. She argued that Yelp should not be immune because it "is
actively participating in promoting the defamation of Plaintiffs."
A00486: 19-20. While Hassell did not analyze the provisions of Section
230 or rely on any case law, she seemed to be articulating an argument that
Yelp was an "information content provider," and was therefore not shielded
from liability. The statute defines an information content provider as any
party "responsible ... in part" for the "creation or development of
infonnation." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). The court of appeal did not adopt this
argument in its Opinion, concluding instead that Section 230 does not apply
because the injunction does not impose any liability on Yelp. Op. 28.
Because Plaintiff did not seek this Court's review of the appellate court's
implicit rejection of these arguments, Yelp will not address them.
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omitted). So too here. As discussed below, in concluding otherwise, the
court of appeal misread Section 230, drastically altering its application in
California. Section C, infi·a.
C.

The Appellate Court's Interpretation Ignores And
Misconstrues Key Parts Of Section 230.

In holding that Section 230 does not protect Yelp, the appellate court
invoked the unique procedural posture of this case-the result of Hassell's
tactical decision to deny Yelp the opportunity to defend itself-explaining
that "[n]either patty cite[ d] any authority that applies section 230 to restrict
a court from directing an Internet service provider to comply with a
judgment which enjoins the originator of defamatory statements posted on
the service provider's Web site." Op. 28. This circular reasoning only
rewards Hassell's disdain for due process. It ignores the fact that to obtain
a remedy against Yelp-the injunction that the appellate court approvedHassell was required to state a claim against Yelp. Here, the defamation
claim that Hassell asserted in an attempt to obtain that relief was not
alleged against Yelp, but regardless, the resulting order against Yelp is
barred by Section 230's plain language. Hassell's claims must be rejected
because they contravene the mandate of Section 230 that "[n]o provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as [a] publisher or
speaker .... " 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l).
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As this Court explained in Barrett, the Court "cannot construe the
statute so as to render [language] inoperative." 42 Cal.4th at 59 (citing
Duncan v. Walker (2001) 533 U.S. 167, 174; Hassan v. Mercy American
River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715-716). There, the Court rejected

plaintiffs reading of Section 230 because it "fails to account for the
statutory provision at the center of our inquiry: the prohibition in section
230(c)(l) against treating any 'user' as 'the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider."' !d. at 60.
The Court summarized:
Section 230 has been interpreted literally. It does Jtot permit
Internet service providers or users to be sued ffS
'distributors,' nor does it expose 'active users' to liability.
Plaintiffs are free under section 23 0 to pursue the originator
of a defamatory Internet publication. Any further expansion
ofliability must await congressional action.
Id. at 63 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Chicago Lawyers, 519 F.3d at

671 (reading Subsection (c)(1) literally to bar claims under Fair Housing
Act because "only in a capacity as publisher could Craigslist be liable");
Dart v. Craigslist, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2009) 665 F.Supp.2d 961, 969 (rejecting

claims against Craigslist based on allegedly illegal adult advertisements
because complaint's allegations "plainly treat Craigslist as the publisher or
speaker ofinfonnation created by its users"). "Plaintiffs who contend they
were defamed in an Internet posting may only seek recovery ji-om the
original source of the statement" (Barrett, 40 Ca1.4th at 40 (emphasis
45

added)), because "Congress has decided that the parties to be punished and
deterred are not the internet service providers but rather are those who
created and posted the illegal material" (MA. ex rel. P.K. v. Village Voice
Media Holdings, LLC (B.D. Mo. 2011) 809 F.Supp.2d 1041, 1055).

Before the court of appeal rejected Section 230's application in this
case, California courts were in accord. "If by imposing liability ... we
ultimately hold eBay responsible for content originating from other parties,
we would be treating it as the publisher, viz., the original communicator,
contrary to Congress's expressed intent ... " Gentry, 99 Cal.App.4th at 831
(citations omitted); see also Doe II, 175 Cal.App.4th at 563, 572-573
("appellants want MySpace to regulate what appears on its Web site" and
"[t]hat type of activity-to restrict or make available certain material-is
expressly covered by section 230"); Delfino, 145 Cal.App.4th at 807
(rejecting claims against website publisher that "treated it 'as the publisher
or speaker' (§ 230(c)( 1)) of Moore's messages" (citations omitted)). 20

20

Accord Murawski v. Pataki (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 514 F.Supp.2d 577,
591 ("Deciding whether or not to remove content or deciding when to
remove content falls squarely within Ask. com's exercise of a publisher's
traditional rule and is therefore subject to the CD A's broad immunity"
(citations omitted)); Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper (M.D. Tenn. 20 13) 939
F.Supp.2d 805, 828-829 (CDA preempted state law that "conflicts with
Congress's intent in enacting CDA section 230 because it imposes liability
on websites acting as publishers of third-party information and creates a
regime that will likely restrict speech and undermine self-policing that
already occurs online").
46

The Ninth Circuit's analysis of Section 230 in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.
(9th Cir. 2009) 570 F .3d 1096 is instructive. There, the court affirmed
dismissal of claims for negligent undertaking based on allegations that
defendant failed to abide by its promise to remove allegedly illicit content.

!d. at 1103, 1106. Rejecting plaintiffs argument that her claims did not
seek to hold defendant liable for publication, but instead for failing to
perform its alleged undertaking, the court explained that "what matters is
whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the
defendant as the 'publisher or speaker' of content provided by another." !d.
at 1101-02. Analyzing what a publisher does, the court explained that "one
does not merely undertake; one undertakes to do something." !d. at 1103
(emphasis in original). Thus, "the duty that [plaintiff] claims [defendant]
violated derives from [defendant's] conduct as a publisher-the steps it
allegedly took, but later supposedly abandoned, to de-publish the offensive
profiles. It is because such conduct is publishing conduct that we have
insisted that section 230 protectsji·om liability 'any activity that can be
boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek
to post online."' !d. at II 03 (citing Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1170-71;
emphasis added). The Court emphasized that "Subsection (c)(I), by itself,
shields from liability all publication decisions, whether to edit, to remove,
or to post, with respect to content generated entirely by third parties." !d. at
1105 (emphasis added).

47

Here, the court of appeal drastically departed from these rulings by
misreading subsection (e)(3) of Section 230 and treating it as a limitation
on the broad immunity established by subsection (c)(1). The court held that
Section 230 did not apply to the prior restraint it imposed on Yelp "because
[the court did] not impose any liability on Yelp, either as a speaker or a
publisher of third-party speech." Op. 29. But Yelp is named in the
injunction only for its role as publisher of the third-party reviews at issue, a
straightforward contradiction of subsection (c)(l)'s prohibition on treating
Yelp as the speaker or publisher of third-party content on its website.
Subsection (e)(3) does not limit the broad immunity provided by subsection
(c)( I), as the court of appeal implicitly held. It merely affirms the ability of
state courts to entertain state law claims that are "consistent" with Section
230, while making clear that "inconsistent" state law claims and liability
are barred. 21 The court of appeal's misreading of subsection (e)(3) renders
subsection (c)(!) meaningless. Barrett, 42 Cal.4th at 59. The court of
appeal's decision to treat subsection (e)(3) as establishing the scope of
immunity undermines the broad protection that Congress intended for
online publishers like Yelp.
21

Further illustrating the court of appeal's misreading, if section (e)
encapsulated Section 230 immunity, then Section 230 would not bar federal
civil claims. Plainly, that is not the case. E.g., Roommates. com, 521 F.3d
at 1170-71 (Section 230 applied to claims under Fair Housing Act);
Chicago Lawyers, 519 FJd at 672 (same); Sikhs for Justice "SFJ", Inc. v.
Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) 144 F.SuppJd 1088 (Section 230
barred federal and state claims).
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The court's conclusion that "[i}f an injunction is itself a fonn of
liability, that liability was imposed on Bird, not Yelp" (Op. 30)-relying on
the fiction that the injunction against Yelp was not actually an injunction
against Yelp (see footnote 5, supra)-exposes another fundamental flaw in
its decision. The court of appeal reached its result only by violating
subsection (c)(l) and treating Yelp as if it was the author (or "speaker") of
the reviews at issue. It held that Yelp could be enjoined, without notice or
an opportunity to be heard, under a limited legal principle that allows coutts
to extend injunctions to non-parties who act on behalf ofparties in violating
the injunction. The court concluded that Yelp was acting "with or for" Bird

as the publisher of the statements at issue. Op. 30-31 (citing Conrad, 55
Cal.App.4th at 903); see Section IV.B, supra. This is, at its core, treating
Yelp as if it, rather than simply Bird, published the allegedly defamatory
content. The court's due process and Section 230 holdings are
fundamentally at odds with each other, resulting in a confusing and
contradictory interpretation of each of these legal principles.
The appellate court also etTed in concluding that Section 230 does
not apply to requests for injunctive relief. Op. 28. The court held that the
injunction "does not violate section 230 because it does not impose any
liability on Yelp," elaborating that "Hassell filed their complaint against
Bird, not Yelp; obtained a default judgment against Bird, not Yelp; and was
awarded damages and injunctive relief against Bird, not Yelp." !d. Thus, it

49

held that the liability that would flow out of contempt proceedings if Yelp
fails to abide by the injunction is not within the scope of Section 230
immunity. But this explanation-key to the ultimate decision-is simply
incorrect. The relief that Hassell obtained against Yelp can only be
characterized as an injunction based on Yelp's activities as a publisher. See
footnote 5, supra.
Courts across the nation consistently have concluded that Section
230 bars injunctive relief, as well as tort and contract liability. As one court
explained, "[a]n action to force a website to remove content on the sole
basis that the content is defamatory is necessarily treating the website as a
publisher, and is therefore inconsistent with section 230." Medytox
Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 152
So.3d 727, 729, 730-731 (rejecting action for declaratory and injunctive
relief based on Section 230).
In the only California case to address the issue, Kathleen R., 87
Cal.App.4th at 697-698, the court held that section 230(c)(1) protected a
city from claims based on public access to the Internet at a public library,
which included a request for injunctive relief. The court explained that "by
its plain language,§ 230[(c)(1)] creates a federal immunity to any cause of
action that would make service providers liable for information originating
with a third-party user of the service." !d. at 692, 697-698 (citation,
internal quotes omitted; bracketed citation in original). Noting that "claims
50

for ... injunctive relief are no less causes of action than tort claims for
damages," the court held that they also "fall squarely within the section
230(e)(3) prohibition." !d. at 698. Plaintiffs equitable claims there
"contravene[d] section 230's stated purpose of promoting unfettered
development of the Internet no less than her damage claims." !d. 22
As the court explained in Noah v. AOL Time Warner (E.D. Va.
2003) 261 F.Supp.2d 532, 538-39, aff'd (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) 2004 WL
602711, "given that the purpose of§ 230 is to shield service providers from
legal responsibility for the statements of third parties, § 230 should not be
read to permit claims that request only injunctive relief. After all, in some
circumstances injunctive relief will be at least as burdensome to the service
provider as damages, and is typically more intrusive." !d. at 540; see id. at
538-39 (in seeking to hold defendant liable for refusing to intervene to stop
22

See also Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983, 986 (Section 230 barred
claims for damages and injunctive relief); Hinton v. Amazon. com.dedc,
LLC (S.D. Miss. 2014) 72 F.Supp.3d 685, 687, 692 (claims seeking
injunctive relief and damages based on allegedly selling recalled hunting
equipment barred by Section 230); Dart v. Craigs/ist, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2009)
665 F.Supp.2d 96!, 963, 969 (rejecting public nuisance claim, including
request for injunctive relief); Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group (E.D. La.
2002) 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24251,2002 WL 31844907, *13-14
(rejecting injunction claim against ISP based on alleged failure to block
purportedly fictitious domain registrants (citing Kathleen R., 87
Cal.App.4th at 697-698)); Giordano v. Romeo (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 76
So.3 d 1100, 1102 (rejecting claims for defamation and injunctive relief);
Shiamili, 17 N.Y.3d at 285, 293 (rejecting defamation claim based on a
blog post, seeking damages and injunctive relief); Reit v. Yelp! (N.Y. Supr.
2010) 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 415 (rejecting request for preliminary injunction,
and granting Yelp's motion to dismiss complaint).
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alleged online harassment and requesting "an injunction requiring
[defendant] to adopt 'affirmative measures' to stop such harassment,"
plaintiff"clearly" is attempting "to 'place' [defendant] 'in a publisher's
role,' in violation of§ 230" (citing Zeran, !29 F.3d at 330)). 23
Hassell admitted below that there is "vibrant, extensive national
jurisprudence on section 230." Respondents' Appeal Brief("R.A.B.") at
43. Yet, Hassell did not cite a single case to support her proposition that
the CDA allows interactive computer services to be subject to injunctions
to remove third-party content so long as they are not named in an action.
Courts across the Nation consistently have rejected liability for the mere
hosting of defamatory speech authored by third parties-which is not
surprising, given that Section 230(c)(l) flatly prohibits such a result.
Plaintiffs also typically satisfy the basic due process requirements that
should have protected Yelp here. In the end, Hassell's demand for
23

Yelp is aware of only two cases to suggest otherwise-both in
dicta without any analysis. In Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of
Loudoun (E.D. Va. 1998) 2 F.Supp.2d 783, the court held that Section
230(c)(2)-a separate subsection not at issue in this case-does not protect
government entities. !d. at 790. In dicta, the court said that even if it did,
"defendants cite no authority to suggest that the 'tort-based' immunity to
'civil liability' described by§ 230 would bar the instant action, which is for
declaratory and injunctive relief." !d. (citing§ 230(a)(2); Zeran, 129 F.3d
at 330). As the court in Kathleen R. later pointed out, Mainstream Loudoun
is distinguishable because subsection (c)(2) contains limiting language that
is not applicable to subsection 230(c)(l). 87 Cal.App.4th at 697-698. In
Does v. Franco Prods. (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2000) 2000 WL 816779, *5, the
court merely cited Mainstream Loudoun to state in dicta that "Plaintiffs'
claims for injunctive relief, although not precluded by the CDA, fail to state
a claim."
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injunctive relief against Yelp fails because it is entirely based on Hassell's
claim that Yelp published defamatory speech, but Section 230 bars all such
claims.
Nor is it relevant that many cases applying Section 230 to
defamation claims involve "allegations of defamatory conduct by a third
party, and not a judicial determination that defamatory statements had, in
fact, been made by such third party on the Internet service provider's
website." Op. 30. This case was able to proceed to a default judgment only
because one ofHassell's targets-the one that had the financial
wherewithal to defend against her demand for an injunction-was
purposefully not named as a party or served with process in the case, and
therefore could not prevent a result that is plainly barred by Section 230.
Under basic due process principles, Yelp is not bound by a finding that
defendant's statements are defamatory because it was not party to the
proceedings that gave rise to that finding. Section IV.A, supra. In any
event, the court's reasoning ignores the language of the CDA, which
assumes that the statements are actually defamatory, but provides immunity
regardless. See Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 39-40. This is a distinction without a
difference, which only serves to inject confusion and ambiguity into
Section 23 0 jurisprudence.
Finally, the court of appeal's conclusion that Section 230(e)(3)'s
reference to "liability" does not extend to contempt sanctions also must be
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flatly rejected. Op. 31. Section 230(e)(3) prohibits both liability and
"cause[s] of action" against website publishers like Yelp, to protect them
"from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles." Roommates, 521
F.3d at 1174-75. See also Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 254-55 (Section
230 provides an "immunity from suit," not merely a "defense to liability").
This goal plainly is not served by a ruling that permits prior restraints to be
entered against website publishers like Yelp without any advance notice or
opportunity to be heard. Section IV.C, supra.
But even if Section 230(e)(3) only barred liability, the appellate
court still would be wrong because it ignored the plain meaning of
"liability"-"legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by
civil remedy or criminal punishment." Liability, Black's Law Dictionary
(lOth ed. 2014). See also Noah, 261 F.Supp.2d at 540 (injunctive relief"is
typically more intrusive" than damage awards). Indeed, American courts
long have recognized the uniquely pernicious dangers of prior restraints on
speech. See Section IV.C, supra. The appellate court's conclusion that
prior restraints are allowed where liability is barred turns the First
Amendment on its head.
The Ninth Circuit recently again rejected gamesmanship that
attempts to circumvent Section 230. Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc. (9th Cir., Sep. 2,
2016) 836 F.3d 1263,2016 U.S. LEXIS 16665. There, the court rebuffed
plaintiffs attempts "to plead around the CDA," "declin[ing] to open the
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door to such artful skirting of the CDA's safe harbor provision," "given
congressional recognition that the Internet serves as a 'forum for a true
diversity of ... myriad avenues for intellectual activity' and 'ha[s]
flourished ... with a minimum of government regulation."' Id at *4
(citations omitted). As the Court explained, "[i]t cannot be the case that the
CDA and its purpose of promoting the 'free exchange of information and
ideas over the Internet' could be so casually eviscerated." Id at *11 (citing

Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122).
Affirming the appellate court's decision, in contrast, would
embolden the kind of abuse that already is happening across the country at
the behest of businesses determined to scrub critical reviews from websites
like Yelp's. For example, a reputation management company hired by a
Georgia dentist unhappy with a negative review fi-audulently obtained a
judgment and injunction in Maryland, which was then presented to Yelp
with a request that Yelp remove the review. RJN Exs. A-B. A lawsuit
recently filed in Northern California details the work of such reputation
management firms, which allegedly are suing pseudo-defendants to obtain
stipulated judgments removing reviews and similar content from websites,
then presenting those judgments to websites to demand that the content be
removed. RJN Ex. C; see also RJN Exs. D-G (discussing similar actions
across the country). Efforts to manipulate court systems and scrub critical
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reviews from the Internet will thrive-in California in particular-if this
Court approves the no-notice injunction entered against Yelp here.
As this Court explained in Barrett, "[a]dopting a rule of liability
under section 23 0 that diverges from the rule announced in Zeran and
followed in all other jurisdictions would be an open invitation to forum
shopping by defamation plaintiffs." 40 Ca1.4th at 58 & n.18 (citation
omitted; emphasis added). Here too, this Court should adhere to the
consistent interpretation of federal courts across the Nation, and broadly
construe Section 230 to bar the injunctive relief against Yelp that was
ordered here.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Court's admonition a decade ago in Barrett applies just as
forcefully now. "The Court of Appeal gave insufficient consideration to
the burden its rule would impose on Internet speech. . .. Congress sought to
'promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services"' by granting broad immunity to "Internet
intermediaries" such as Yelp. 40 Ca1.4th at 56 (citations omitted).

Ill
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For all of the foregoing reasons, Yelp respectfully requests that the
Court reverse the orders of the trial court and appellate court, and direct
those courts to enter an order granting Yelp's Motion to Vacate the
Judgment.
Dated: November 21, 2016

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
Thomas R. Burke
Rochelle L. Wilcox
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